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SUBORDINATION AGREEMENT PROVISIONS
SHIFTING CHAPTER 11 VOTING RIGHTS:
CAN THE SENIORs DISENFRANCHISE THE
JUNIORS?
ALAN N.RESNICK

In this article, Prof Resnick examines how courts have dealt with voting rights
provisionsfound in subordinationagreements.

Subordination
agreements among creditors are common in financial

transactions. When a company seeks additional credit, the new lender
may insist on an agreement with existing creditors which provides that
their right to payment will be subordinated to the full payment of the new
loan. The existing creditors may be willing to sign such an agreement for
the purpose of encouraging the new lender to provide the borrower with liquidity needed to continue the business as a profitable venture, thereby
increasing the likelihood that the borrower will meet all future financial
obligations. In addition, contractual subordination is used frequently in
connection with the issuance of debt securities. The level of priority of the
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debt securities, whether senior or junior, will directly affect their interest rate
and market price.
In general, contractual subordination will be respected in the event the
borrower becomes a debtor in a bankruptcy case. Section 510(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code provides that "[a] subordination agreement is enforceable
in a case under this title to the same extent that such agreement is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law."' Unless a bankruptcy court
rearranges priorities based on equitable principles, known as equitable subordination, or the class of senior creditors effectively waives the benefits of
the subordination agreement by voting to accept a chapter 11 plan in which
they give up their rights to junior creditors, 2 the subordination agreement
controls the ranking of prebankruptcy claims against the bankruptcy estate.,
In addition to using subordination agreements to achieve priority over
other creditors with respect to the payment of their claims, senior creditors
also use them to obtain other rights from junior creditors. In particular, subordination agreements have included provisions that give the senior creditor
the right to cast the junior creditor's vote to either accept or reject a plan of
reorganization in the event the borrower is in chapter 11. These provisions
effectively give a senior creditor two votes; it may vote with respect to its own
claim and may vote again with respect to the subordinated claim. Senior
creditors have argued that these provisions should be enforceable as a matter
of contract, but junior creditors, wishing to vote on a chapter 11 plan despite
the contractual provision, have argued that the enforcement of these provisions would be inconsistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code
granting voting rights only to the holders of claims. This article will examine how courts have dealt with these voting rights provisions found in subordination agreements.

VOTING RIGHTS IN CHAPTER 11: WHY THEY ARE
IMPORTANT
The Bankruptcy Code requires that every chapter 11 plan designate
classes of claims and interests, except for certain priority claims.4 The claims
included in a particular class must be "substantially similar" to the other
claims in the class.' Frequently, senior claims and junior claims are placed in
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separate classes and given different treatment under a chapter 11 plan.6 The
Code also requires that the plan describe the treatment that each class will
receive and designate whether the class is "impaired" or "unimpaired" by the
plan. 7 There are two ways in which a class of claims is left unimpaired by
the plan. First, the plan leaves a class unimpaired if it does not alter the legal,
equitable, or contractual rights of the holders of the claims in that class.'
Second, despite prior defaults, a plan may leave a class unimpaired if all
defaults are cured (other than defaults based on the debtor's bankruptcy or
insolvency or certain other nonmonetary defaults), the original maturity
dates that existed before the default and acceleration are reinstated, the creditors are compensated for damages resulting from their reasonable reliance
on contractual provisions or applicable law that gives them the right to accelerate payment, and the rights of the creditors in that class are not otherwise
altered.'
If a class of claims remains unimpaired by the plan, the class, including
each creditor holding a claim in that class, is conclusively presumed to have
accepted the plan and, therefore, such creditors are not entitled to vote on
the plan."' But if the class is impaired, the holders of claims in the class have
a right to vote to accept or reject the plan." The plan proponent solicits
votes from impaired creditors by distributing ballots, certain required
notices, and a court-approved disclosure statement. 2
Confirmation of a chapter 11 plan depends on its acceptance by classes
of claims and interests. There are two basic methods for confirming a plan.
The most common method is by obtaining the acceptance of each and every
impaired class, and by satisfying certain other requirements set forth in the
Bankruptcy Code. 3 However, in the event that one or more impaired classes do not accept the plan, the court may confirm the plan nonetheless under
the so-called "cram down" provisions of chapter 11, but only if at least one
class, not counting the votes of insiders, has accepted the plan and certain
other requirements are met."
In order to obtain the acceptance of a class of claims, it is necessary to
receive a sufficient number of acceptances based on a required percentage of
creditors of that class who actually vote. The plan will be deemed accepted
by a class if the creditors who hold at least two-thirds in dollar amount and
more than one-half in number of the total allowed claims of the class who
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actually vote accept the plan. Only the claims held by those creditors who
vote to accept or reject the plan are counted for this purpose. For example,
suppose there are 100 creditors holding claims totalling $10 million in the
same class. Assume further that only 30 of those creditors, holding a total
of $1 million in claims, vote on the plan. For the class to accept the plan, it
must be accepted by at least 16 creditors (more than one-half of those that
vote) who hold at least $666,667 in allowed claims (two-thirds in amount of
the allowed claims held by those who voted)."
The importance of voting rights of creditors in chapter 11 cases is best
discussed in the context of an illustration. Suppose that an insolvent corporate debtor in chapter 11 proposes a plan that has two classes of unsecured
claims and one class of shareholders. Class A includes senior unsecured
claims and Class B includes junior unsecured claims held by creditors who
contractually agreed to be subordinated to Class A creditors. The plan provides that (a) Class A senior creditors will receive deferred cash payments
equal to the full amount of their claims, (b) Class B junior creditors will
receive payment of only ten percent of the amount of their claims, and (c)
shareholders will continue to own their shares without any dilution. Both
Class A and Class B are impaired and entitled to vote on the plan. In this
situation, it is likely that Class B junior creditors would vote to reject the
plan, thus forcing the debtor to obtain confirmation under the cram down
provisions of the Code. If so, the plan could not be confirmed because it is
does not satisfy the "fair and equitable" requirement under section 1129(b).'6
A plan is not fair and equitable with respect to the nonaccepting class of
junior creditors unless it gives each holder of a Class B claim property equal
to the allowed amount of its claim or, in the alternative, the plan provides
that shareholders shall not receive or retain any property on account of their
equity interests." This is the so-called "absolute priority rule" applicable in
chapter 11. That is, the plan may not be crammed down the junior creditors unless they are paid in full with some form of property or the shareholders lose their shares entirely. In contrast, if Class B accepts this plan, it
may be confirmed without satisfying the fair and equitable requirement.
Therefore, Class B's right to vote against the plan is an important safeguard
against shareholders maintaining their equity interests while paying Class B
creditors only a small fraction of their claims.
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Now suppose that the subordination agreement contains a provision
that gives the senior creditors the right to cast votes on the plan on behalf of
the junior creditors. If enforceable, that contractual provision would enable
the senior creditors to control Class B's vote, thereby depriving Class B
junior creditors the opportunity to vote to reject the plan. In this situation,
Class A senior creditors would vote to accept the plan on behalf of Class B,
as well as Class A, causing the court to confirm the plan as accepted by all
impaired classes. The junior creditors would be bound to accept payment of
only ten percent of their claims while equity holders continue to own the
entire company. The result deprives the junior creditors of the protection of
the absolute priority rule. This scenario is not unrealistic because the senior
creditors, who would be receiving full payment of their claims, would be
eager to have the plan confirmed and would have no incentive to bargain for
a greater distribution for the disenfranchised junior creditors.

DECISIONS ENFORCING VOTE TRANSFER PROVISIONS
In general, advocates have offered two main reasons why provisions
transferring voting rights to senior creditors under a subordination agreement should be enforceable. The first reason is based on traditional contract
law principles. As discussed above, section 510(a) of the Bankruptcy Code
expressly provides that subordination agreements are enforceable to the same
extent that they are enforceable under nonbankruptcy law. From a policy
perspective, parties are expected to bargain rationally. If a party voluntarily
enters into a subordination agreement containing a vote transfer provision,
it can be assumed that the subordinated creditor received a benefit in
exchange and expects the agreement to be enforced. The senior creditor also
can be expected to have relied on the vote transfer provision as an inducement for granting credit or for giving some other form of consideration. In
essence, the traditional contract argument is that the agreement should be
enforced consistent with the parties' intent.
The second reason advanced for enforcing vote transfer provisions is
that a subordinated creditor has no interest in its claim until the senior creditor is paid in full. Based on this "no interest" rationale, it would be
inequitable for the junior creditor to be allowed to vote on a plan that affects
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the senior creditor. In essence, the senior creditor has a superior interest in
the junior creditor's claim and should be considered the holder of the claim
for voting purposes.

The Curtis Center Limited Partnership Case
Several courts have enforced vote transfer provisions based on one or
both of these arguments. For example, a bankruptcy court recognized the
enforceability of such a provision in In re Curtis Center Limited Partnership,8
a real estate chapter 11 case. Sumitomo Trust and Banking Co., Ltd., which
was the holder of an undersecured first mortgage, entered into a subordination agreement in which Mellon Bank, a junior mortgagee owed approximately $25 million, agreed to subordinate its entire indebtedness - including any distributions to be made to Mellon under any plan of reorganization
or from any other source - to the approximately $84 million debt owed to
Sumitomo. When Sumitomo filed a motion for relief from the automatic
stay, it made several arguments in support of its motion, including that the
debtor would not be able to obtain confirmation of any chapter 11 plan
because it would never be able to obtain the affirmative vote of any impaired
class of claims, excluding the votes of insiders, as required under section
1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code.' 9 The debtor argued that it would be
able to satisfy the requirements under section 1129(a)(10) because its plan
placed Mellon Bank in a separate class and provided for the payment of $1.3
million to Mellon.20 The debtor argued that Mellon would likely vote in
favor of this plan, thereby satisfying the requirements under section
1129(a)(10).
Sumitomo countered the debtor's argument by relying on the language
of the subordination agreement that expressly granted to Sumitomo the
authority to perform certain acts on behalf of Mellon in the event of the borrower's bankruptcy. In particular, the subordination agreement specifically
stated that Sumitomo was authorized on behalf of Mellon to "'vote or consent in any proceedings with respect to any and all claims of [Mellon] relating to [Mellon's] debt, in each case as Sumitomo may deem advisable, in its
sole discretion.'21 Sumitomo had repeatedly stressed its right to vote
Mellon's claim and "has stated matter of factly that it will vote on Mellon's
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behalf to reject the Debtor's plan."22 The court found Sumitomo's argument
persuasive, finding that there was no hope that the debtor would be able to
obtain an acceptance with respect to the Mellon claim because it would be
Sumitomo, rather than Mellon, casting the vote. Therefore, the class consisting solely of the Mellon claim should be disregarded for purposes of evaluating the prospect of the debtor satisfying section 1129(a)(10). "The language of the subordination agreement is plain and unambiguous. The terms
of this prepetition agreement are fully enforceable in this Bankruptcy case
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 510(a)."23

The Inter Urban Broadcasting Case
Another decision upholding the vote transfer provisions of a subordina4
tion agreement was rendered in In re Inter Urban Broadcasting.2
A company that was indebted to Firstmark Credit Corporation borrowed funds from
Barclays Business Credit, Inc., in part to pay a portion of the earlier debt.
As a condition precedent to extending credit, Firstmark, Barclays, and the
borrower signed a subordination agreement which provided that Firstmark
assigned and subordinated to Barclays all of its claims, collateral, interests
and rights against the borrower until Barclays was paid in full. The agreement gave Barclays the right to vote Firstmark's claim in connection with
any plan of reorganization. Later, when the borrower was in chapter 11,
Barclays filed a creditor's plan of reorganization providing for the sale of the
debtor's assets, payment of only a portion of Barclays' claim, and no payment
to Firstmark. Barclays voted both its own and Firstmark's claims to accept
the plan. When the debtor objected to Barclays' plan and moved to disqualify Barclays' votes, the bankruptcy court denied the motion and confirmed Barclays' plan.
On appeal to the district court, the debtor argued that Firstmark must
be deemed to have rejected the plan because it would not receive any distribution on its claim. Under section 11 2 6 (g) of the Bankruptcy Code, a class
is deemed to have rejected a plan if the holders of claims in that class are not
entitled to receive anything under the plan.25 The district court noted that
the debtor did not provide any authority regarding the application of section
11 2 6 (g) when a class consisting of a junior creditor will receive no distribu-

303

BANKING LAW JOURNAL

tion under the plan, but the junior creditor subordinated its claim and
transferred its voting rights to a senior creditor who then votes to accept the
plan. Although that argument was not raised in the bankruptcy court, that
court found that, under the subordination agreement, Barclays was granted
the right to vote Firstmark's claim. It also found that Firstmark had been
given notice of the bankruptcy proceeding, had appeared through counsel of
record, and did not object to Barclays' voting of Firstmark's claim.
The district court found that Firstmark had benefited from Barclays'
loans to the debtor and, in exchange for that benefit, assigned and subordinated its claims and rights to Barclays. In addition, the district court found
that "Firstmark held no claim or interest and could not do so unless and
until Barclays was paid in full." 26 Therefore, the only way for the debtors to
prevail on the voting issue was to persuade the court that the subordination
agreement should not be enforced. Noting that the Bankruptcy Code provides that a subordination agreement is enforceable in a bankruptcy case to
the same extent that it is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law,27
and that the debtors did not attack the agreement as unenforceable under
nonbankruptcy law, the district court upheld the subordination agreement,
including the vote transfer provision, and held that Barclays' vote of
Firstmark's claim was proper.

The Davis Broadcasting Case
Similarly, in In re Davis Broadcasting,Inc.,2" a lender, Broadcast Capital,
Inc., filed a motion to reopen a chapter 11 case and to modify the order confirming the plan of reorganization. Before the chapter 11 case commenced,
Broadcast signed a subordination agreement with AmeriTrust, another creditor, in which Broadcast agreed to subordinate its claim to that of AmeriTrust's
lien and to give AmeriTrust, in addition to other rights, the right to vote on
behalf of Broadcast in a bankruptcy proceeding. AmeriTrust subsequently
voted, on its own behalf and on behalf of Broadcast, to accept the debtor's
plan of reorganization. Broadcast neither objected to confirmation nor
appealed the confirmation order. The plan was substantially consummated,
but eight months later, Broadcast filed its motion to reopen the case to correct an error in the plan. Although the court did not expressly rule on the
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validity of the subordination agreement provision transferring Broadcast's
voting rights to AmeriTrust, it stated, in dicta, that it "must keep in mind that
Broadcast was not forced to loan money to the Debtor and enter into the
Subordination Agreement .... In essence Broadcast is saying that it should

not suffer any ill effects from AmeriTrust's not protecting its interests as it
would have preferred, although Broadcast freely entered into the
Subordination Agreement that put it into this situation."29 The court criti30
cized Broadcast for not wanting to "be held responsible for its own.actions."
Without ruling on the issue, the court appeared to have recognized the
enforceability of the vote transfer provision of the subordination agreement.

The Pre-Code Decision in the Itemiab Case
Perhaps the most far-reaching decision giving a senior creditor the right
1
to vote the claim of a subordinated creditor was Matter ofItemlab, Inc.," a
case decided under the former Bankruptcy Act. After Blanmill Realty Corp.
signed an agreement in which it agreed to subordinate its claim to the claim
of Dutch-American Mercantile Corp. until it was paid in full, the debtor
filed a petition under Chapter XI of the former Bankruptcy Act. The plan
of arrangement provided for payment of 25 percent of the creditors' claims,
thereby enabling Dutch-American, the senior creditor, to receive payment
equal to 25 percent of its claim and 25 percent of Blanmill's claim. DutchAmerican was against the plan and wanted to vote its claim and Blanmill's
claims to defeat the plan. The bankruptcy referee held that the answer to the
question as to who had the right to cast the vote representing the Blanmill
claim depended on the terms and effect of the subordination agreement executed by the debtor, Blanmill, and Dutch-American.
Blanmill argued unsuccessfully that it is a creditor, notwithstanding the
subordination agreement, and should have been permitted to vote on the
plan. Although the agreement was silent as to voting rights, the court interpreted the agreement as a "complete subordination agreement"3 2 which entitled Dutch-American to have "complete control over the claim."" Before
the Bankruptcy Code's enactment in 1978 and section 510(a)'s express
recognition of the enforceability of subordination agreements,3 courts relied
on several equitable theories to uphold and enforce subordination agree-
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ments. Courts found, alternatively, that a senior creditor obtains an equitable lien on the junior claim,3 or that subordination results in an equitable
assignment of the claim.6 Other courts have held that subordination results
in a constructive trust whereby the junior creditor continues to hold its
claim as a constructive trustee for the benefit of the senior creditor.17 The
court in Itemlab stated that, regardless of these equitable approaches, "it is
quite obvious that in each case substance and not form prevailed and that
the intent of the parties is paramount."" Although there was no legal assignment of the claim, nor any equitable assignment until a determination that
Itemlab was insolvent and had insufficient assets to pay Dutch-American's
claim in full, the court found that "according to the terms of the contract it
was the clear intention of the parties, upon the occurrence of insolvency and
insufficiency of assets for Dutch's claim out of the dividends of both claims,
to make an immediate transfer of Branmill's claim to Dutch." 39
The Itemlab court found that because the subordination agreement was
signed by the debtor, the junior creditor, and the senior creditor, it was the
clear intent of all three parties that the debtor would pay the senior creditor
the junior creditor's claims in the event of insolvency.40 Although the agreement was silent regarding the right to vote the claim of the junior creditor,
the court concluded, in a classic application of the "no interest" rationale,
that only the senior creditor should have the right to vote the claim:
"Since the vote attached to the claim is the only means of determining
how and when the claim shall be enforced and the terms of payment, it
would follow that the person entitled to collect the claim should be the
person entitled to vote the claim; otherwise the result would be anomalous and would repose in the inferior creditor the power to use his vote
to determine how the superior creditor shall collect a claim in which the
inferior creditor no longer has an interest."4 '

VOTE TRANSFER PROVISIONS HELD UNENFORCEABLE
Departing from those judicial decisions that upheld the enforceability of
vote transfer provisions in subordination agreements, the Bankruptcy Court
for the Northern District of Illinois refused to enforce such a provision in In
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re 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership.

The debtor, 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, owned fifteen floors of
a commercial office building on which there was a first mortgage in favor of
Bank of America to secure a loan obtained in 1987. In 1988, the debtor
obtained a second mortgage loan from its general partner, North LaSalle Street
Limited Partnership. The second mortgage explicitly provided that it was subordinated to the bank's first mortgage. At the time the second mortgage loan
was given, North LaSalle and the bank also entered into an intercreditor agreement providing that North LaSalle's loan was subordinate to the bank's loan.
Four years later, North LaSalle and the bank entered into a "Consent and
Subordination Agreement" in consideration for the bank's waiver of certain
rights under the original loan documents. This agreement included a comprehensive subordination provision and, for the first time, provided that the
bank could vote North LaSalle's claim in any reorganization case."
Unable to pay the first mortgage loan, the debtor filed a chapter 11 petition in 1995, when the outstanding balance owed to Bank of America was
approximately $93 million and the balance owed to North LaSalle on the
junior mortgage loan was approximately $11 million. A plan of reorganization was confirmed by the bankruptcy court, but the confirmation order was
reversed by the Supreme Court for reasons unrelated to the subordination
provisions." After the case was remanded, Bank of America filed a complaint
commencing an adversary proceeding seeking a declaration that, among
other things, '5 it was entitled to vote the claim of North LaSalle in anticipated confirmation proceedings. North LaSalle contended that it had the
right to vote its own claim with respect to any chapter 11 plan, notwithstanding the subordination agreement.
The bankruptcy court began its analysis by focusing on section 1126(a)
of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that "[t]he holder of a claim ...
may accept or reject a plan." 6 Since the parties acknowledged that North
LaSalle is the holder of the claim under the second mortgage loan, North
LaSalle should be the only party with the ability to vote that claim with
respect to any plan of reorganization, unless there is some basis for deviating
from the plain language of section 1126(a). Bank of America offered several reasons for deviating from this statutory language, but the bankruptcy
court rejected each one.
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First, the bank argued that it had the right to vote North LaSalle's claim
because of the clear language of the subordination agreement. The court
rejected that argument, noting that "[i]t is generally understood that prebankruptcy agreements do not override contrary provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code.... Indeed, since bankruptcy is designed to produce a system of reorganization and distribution different from what would obtain
under nonbankruptcy law, it would defeat the purpose of the Code to allow
parties to provide by contract that the provisions of the Code should not
apply."4 7 The court was referring to numerous decisions in which courts
have refused to enforce prebankruptcy agreements that had the effect of
depriving a party of the benefits of bankruptcy.48 Therefore, the "fact that
North LaSalle agreed that the Bank could vote its claim as part of a subordination agreement does not provide a basis for disregarding § 112 6 (a)."*
The bank's second argument was based on section 510(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code, which expressly recognizes the enforceability of subordination agreements to the same extent they are enforceable under nonbankruptcy law. But the court construed section 510(a) narrowly, rejecting the
argument that voting provisions contained in subordination agreements are
within the scope of the Code's express recognition of the enforceability of
subordination agreements. Black's Law Dictionary defines "subordination"
as "[t] he act or process by which a person's rights or claims are ranked below
those ofothers." 0 The court reasoned that this definition supports the view
that subordination "affects the order of priority of payment of claims in
bankruptty, but not the transfer of voting rights."" As further support for
its positi6ti, the court cited In re HartSki Mfg. Co.,5 2 where the bankruptcy
court held that a subordinated secured creditor was entitled to adequate protection of its claim.
"The intent of §510(a) ... is to allow the consensual and contractual priority of payment to be maintained between creditors among themselves
in a bankruptcy proceeding. There is no indication that Congress
intended to allow creditors to alter, by a subordination agreement, the
bankruptcy laws unrelated to distribution of assets.""
The court in Hart Ski went beyond the adequate protection issue when,
in dicta, it stated that the Code "guarantees each secured creditor certain
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rights, regardless of subordination ... includ[ing] the right ... to participate
in the voting for confirmation or rejection of any plan of reorganization.""
The third argument rejected by the court was that Bank of America had
the right to vote North LaSalle's claim because of Rule 3018(c) of the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, which requires that an acceptance or
rejection of a plan be signed by the creditor or equity security holder "or an
authorized agent."" The bank argued that, by virtue of the subordination
agreement, it was an "authorized agent" of the subordinated creditor for the
purpose of voting. However, an agent is "commonly understood to act at
the direction of a principal.""6 The court reasoned that the "test of agency is
the existence of the right to control the method or manner of accomplishing
a task by the alleged agent." 7 The court commented that the bank would
not be voting at the direction or under the control of North LaSalle and, in
fact, the bank would be voting in its own interests which may be contrary to
the interests of North LaSalle. Therefore, the court held that the bank could
not be viewed as the agent for North LaSalle under Rule 3018(c)."
The court then considered policy arguments regarding section 1126(a) of
the Code. The court found that the plain language of the section, which gives
the "holder" of a claim the right to vote, is "completely consistent with reasonable bankruptcy policy." 9 Despite subordination, a junior creditor may
have an interest in how the claim is treated in a chapter 11 plan.
"Subordination affects only the priority of payment, not the right of payment."" A subordinated creditor may have the potential to receive a distribution if the assets of the estate are sufficient, "and Congress may well have
determined to protect that potential by allowing the subordinated claim to be
voted. This result assures that the holder of a subordinated claim has a potential role in the negotiation and confirmation of a plan, a role that would be
eliminated by enforcing contractual transfers of Chapter 11 voting rights."'

WHEN THE SENIOR CREDITOR HAS A SECURITY
INTEREST INTHE JUNIOR CLAIM
The court's reasoning in 203 North LaSalle Street is persuasive. An entity's right to vote on a chapter 11 plan depends on its status as a "holder" of
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the claim, and subordination alone should not affect the junior creditor's status as the holder. A provision in the subordination agreement expressly giving the senior creditor the right to vote the junior claim should not, by itself,
override the absolute priority rule, which is a key protection afforded creditors under the Bankruptcy Code.
Suppose, however, that the subordinated creditor expressly grants to the
senior creditor a present, enforceable security interest in the junior claim to
secure the debtor's payment obligation on the senior debt. Does the security interest affect the enforceability of the separate provision of the agreement
that gives the senior creditor the right to vote the junior claim? The court in
203 North LaSalle Street did not address this issue, but earlier decisions, such
as In re Inter Urban Broadcasting,62 upheld vote transfer provisions where a
junior creditor assigned its claim to a senior creditor under the subordination agreement."3
In general, a person with a security interest in a claim against the debtor
has the right to vote the claim in the debtor's bankruptcy case according to
the relative interests of the parties.' Rule 3001(e) of the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure, which governs transfers of claims other than those
based on publicly traded debt securities, specifically addresses voting rights
when claims are transferred for security. Whether a claim is transferred for
security before or after a proof of claim has been filed in the bankruptcy case,
"[i]f the transferor or transferee does not file an agreement regarding its relative rights respecting voting of the claim, payment of dividends thereon, or
participation in the administration of the estate, on motion by a party in
interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall enter such orders
respecting these matters as may be appropriate."6 The Advisory Committee
Note to Rule 3001 explains the basis for this rule. "An assignee for security
has been recognized as a rightful claimant in bankruptcy.""
Rule 3001(e) recognizes that it is common practice for a creditor holding a claim against the debtor, and a third party with a security interest in
the claim, to enter into an agreement regarding voting rights in the event the
debtor is in chapter 11. The rule merely requires that the agreement be filed
in the court for it to be effective. Otherwise, on request of either party, the
court determines the relative voting rights, apparently based on the parties'
respective interests in the claim.
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The recognition of agreements regarding the voting rights of entities
with security interests in claims against the debtor, together with the unwillingness of some courts to enforce vote transfer provisions in subordination
agreements, raises the question of whether the granting of a security interest
as part of the subordination agreement should always enable senior creditors
to obtain voting rights, thereby depriving a class of junior claims of the
absolute priority rule. Would courts that follow 203 North LaSalle Street
allow a senior creditor to vote a subordinated claim over the objection of the
junior creditor where the senior creditor is granted a security interest in the
subordinated claim? Although a secured creditor may be the holder of the
claim for limited purposes, and therefore a proper party to vote the claim, it
also could be argued that the policy of affording all classes the protection of
the absolute priority rule, or the right to waive it, outweighs the policy of
giving secured creditors the right to vote in the context of a subordination
agreement. The answer to this question will have to await further judicial
development. In any event, unless and until courts resolve this issue, it is
likely that more senior lenders will attempt to obtain security interests in
junior claims to increase the likelihood that contractual shifting of voting
rights in chapter 11 cases will be enforced.

CONCLUSION
In view of the recent decision of the bankruptcy court in 203 North
LaSalle Street, senior lenders should not rely on the enforceability of vote
transfer provisions in subordination agreements. The Bankruptcy Code limits the right to vote to the holder of the claim and subordination alone does
not make the senior creditor the holder. Moreover, shifting voting rights to
senior creditors could have the effect of depriving the holders of junior
claims of the absolute priority rule embodied in chapter 11.
However, when a creditor grants to a third party a security interest in its
claim, the Bankruptcy Rules and judicial decisions recognize the validity and
enforceability of agreements allocating voting rights between the parties and,
in the absence of a voting rights agreement, the court may allocate such
rights. It remains to be seen whether those courts that would otherwise
refuse to enforce vote transfer provisions of subordination agreements, such
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as the 203 North LaSalle Street court, will enforce vote transfer provisions in
the context of a subordination agreement coupled with the grant of a security interest in the junior claims.

NOTES
I11 U.S.C. §510(a). Before the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, there
were no statutory provisions recognizing or giving effect to subordination agreements
in bankruptcy cases. The former Bankruptcy Act, which was in effect from 1898
until the effective date of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, was silent on contractual subordination. Nonetheless, although subordination agreements by their terms modified the statutory scheme of priorities under the old Bankruptcy Act, bankruptcy
courts relied on their equitable powers to give effect to such agreements. As the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reasoned, "[e]quitable considerations ...
require that the concept of equal distribution be applied only to creditors of equal

rank, i.e., creditors who are similarly situated. Creditors who expressly agree to subordinate their claims against a debtor and the creditors for whose benefit the agreement to subordinate is executed are not similarly situated." In re CreditIndus. Corp.,
366 F.2d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 1966). See also In re WT Grant Co., 75 B.R. 163
(S.D.N.Y. 1987). See generally, Heather J.VanMeter, How Explicit Do You Need to
Be? An Analysis of the Rule ofExplicitness after Southeast Banking, 105 Commercial
L.J. 35, 41-44 (2000). Reliance on equitable powers to enforce subordination agreements is no longer necessary because the Bankruptcy Code, in section 510(a),
expressly provides for their enforcement.
I The legislative history to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, referring to

Section 510(a), recognizes that a bankruptcy court is required to enforce subordination agreements, but that "[a] subordination agreement will not be enforced,
however, in a reorganization case in which the class that is the beneficiary of the
agreement has accepted, as specified in 11 U.S.C. § 1126, a plan that waives rights
under the agreement. Otherwise, the agreement would prevent just what chapter

11 contemplates: that seniors may give up rights to juniors in the interest of confirmation of a plan and rehabilitation of the debtor." H.R. Rep. No. 595, 359 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6339.
Although a subordination agreement usually is enforced as written, courts often
require a clear and unambiguous statement in the agreement if the senior creditor
seeks to obtain postpetition interest from distributions that otherwise would be paid
to junior creditors. See, e.g., Alan N. Resnick and Brad Eric Scheler, "The Right of

a Senior Creditor to Receive Post-Petition Interest from a Subordinated Creditor's
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Distributions: Did the Rule of Explicitness Survive the Enactment of the
Bankruptcy Code," 32 U.C.C. L.J. 466 (2000).
' 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(1). Claims that are not placed in classes are administrative
expense claims, claims that arise between the filing of an involuntary petition and
the order for relief, and priority tax claims.
11 U.S.C. § 1122(a).
6 For a discussion on whether senior and junior claims may be placed in the same
class, see Daniel C. Cohn, "Subordinated Claims: Their Classification and Voting
Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code," 56 Am. Bankr. L. J. 293, 304-307
(1982).
' 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)( 2 ) and (a)(3).
8 11 U.S.C. § 1124(1).
9 11 U.S.C. § 1124(2).
11 U.S.C. § 1126(f).
11 U.S.C. § 1126(a).
S11 U.S.C. § 1125. See also Fed.R. Bankr. P. 3017(d).
3 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a).
1 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b). To confirm a plan under the cram down method, the
requirements of section 1129(a), other than the requirement that every class accepts
the plan, must be satisfied, and the plan must be fair and equitable and may not discriminate unfairly, with respect to all nonaccepting classes. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b).
" 11 U.S.C. §1126(c). The percentage of votes required for a class of equity interests to accept a plan is governed by section 1126(d).
Despite the number of acceptances, however, the court has the power to disqualify the vote of any creditor or equity interest holder whose acceptance or rejection
was not cast in good faith, is not solicited or procured in good faith, or was in violation of any provision of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. §1126(e).
6 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b).
17 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B).
18
192 B.R. 648 (Bankr. E.D.Pa. 1996).
19 See 11 U.S.C. § 1 129(a)(10), which provides that:
"(a) The court shall confirm a plan only if all of the following requirements are
met:
(10) If a class of claims is impaired under the plan, at least one class of claims
that is impaired under the plan has accepted the plan, determined without
including any acceptance of the plan by any insider."
20 The court indicated that these funds would be directly or indirectly derived from
a source other than the debtor "in a manner that would permit Mellon to retain said
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funds notwithstanding any subordination agreement between Mellon and
Sumitomo." 192 B.R. at 659.
zi 192 B.R. at 660.
22 Id
23 Id.
24 1994 WL 646176 (E.D. La.
1994).
25
11 U.S.C. § 1126(g).
26 1994 WL 646176 (E.D. La. 1994), at *2.
27 11 U.S.C. §510(a).
28 169 B.R. 229 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 176 B.R. 290
(M.D. Ga. 1994).
29

Id. at 234.

Id
197 ESupp. 194 (E.D.N.Y 1961).
32 197 ESupp. at
197.
197 ESupp. at 197.
- 11 U.S.C. § 510(a).
3
See, e.g., In re Geo. P Schinzel & Co., Inc., 16 E2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1926); Searle v.
Mechanics'Loan & Trust Co., 249 E 942 (9th Cir. 1918).
36 See, e.g., In re Handy-Andy Community Stores, Inc., 2 ESupp. 97 (WD. La. 1932).
37 See, e.g., In reDodge-FreedmanPoultry Co., 148 ESupp. 647 (D.N.H. 1956), aff'd
244 F.2d 314 (1st Cir. 1957).
38 197 ESupp. at 197.
3
Id. at 197-198.
30

3

40

Id. at 197.

Id. at 198. The Itemlab court's reliance on the "no interest" theory is further evidenced by its reference to Meinhard, Greff& Co. v. Brown. 199 E2d 70 (4th Cir.
1952), another pre-Code case which did not involve a subordination agreement, as
authority for its ruling. In Meinhard, a bond issued by a corporation was pledged
by the bond owner to secure payment of another debt of the corporation. The face
amount of the bond was much larger than the balance of the debt for which the
bond was pledged. The court in Meinhard held that the creditor pledgee was entitled to vote the claim represented by the bond in the corporation's reorganization
proceeding to the extent of the amount secured by the pledge, with the bond owner
entitled to vote the remainder of the claim. The court reasoned that, despite the
absence of any statutory provisions dealing with the issue, it may rely on equitable
powers to reach a result based on the interest of each party with respect to the bond
. "We have no doubt as to the power of the court, under such circumstances, to
apportion the vote of the bond in accordance with the interest of the owner and
41

314

SUBORDINATION AGREEMENT PROVISIONS SHIFTING CHAPTER 11VOTING RIGHTS

pledgee respectively." Id. at 75.
42 246 B.R. 325 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 2000).
4
The "Consent and Subordination Agreement" contained the following provision:
"[North LaSalle] further agrees that in the event of any dissolution, winding
up, liquidation, readjustment, reorganization or other similar proceeding relating to ... the [debtor] ... , whether in bankruptcy, insolvency, or receivorship

... [liabilities owed to the bank] shall first be paid in full before [North
LaSalle] shall be entitled to receive and to retain any payment or distribution
in respect of the liabilities [of the debtor under the second mortgage], and in
order to implement the foregoing, (a) all payments and distributions of any
kind or character in respect of the [debt owed to North LaSalle] ... shall be
made directly to [Bank of America] ... and ( c) [North LaSalle] hereby irrevocably agrees that [Bank of America] may, at its sole discretion, in the name of
[North LaSalle] or otherwise, demand, sue for, collect, receive and receipt for
any and all such payments or distributions and file, prove, and vote or consent
in any such proceedings with respect to, any and all claims of [North LaSalle]
relating to the [debts owed to North LaSalle]."
246 B.R. at 327-328.
4
The Supreme Court reversed the confirmation order because the plan did not
meet the "fair and equitable" requirement for confirmation over the objection of a
class of creditors that did not accept the plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b). Bank of
America Nat'l Trust and Savings Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership,526 U.S. 434,
119 S.Ct. 1411, 143 L.Ed. 607 (1999).
" The bank also asked for a declaration that its entire claim, including any portion
in excess of the value of the property, must be paid before North LaSalle receives any
payment from the debtor on account of its subordinated claim. North LaSalle
argued that the bank was entitled to payment only up to the value of the property
because the obligation owed to the bank was nonrecourse. The bankruptcy court
rejected North LaSalle's argument and held that any unsecured deficiency portion of
the bank's claim is entitled to senior status over North LaSalle's claim. The court
held that the agreement was unambiguous and clearly showed the parties' intent to
subordinate North LaSalle's claim to the bank's entire claim, including any deficiency claim. 246 B.R. at 328-330.
6 11 U.S.C. § 1126(a).
1
246 B.R. at 331.
* The court cited In re Cole, 226 B.R. 647, 652 n.7 (9th Cit. BAP 1998), where
the bankruptcy appellate panel collected decisions refusing to enforce prepetition
waivers of bankruptcy benefits other than discharge of indebtedness.
9 246 B.R. at 331.
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Id., citing Joseph R. Nolan and Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Black's Law
Dictionary 1426 (6th ed. 1990).
5o

"' 246 B.R. at 331.

5 B.R. 734 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980).
" 5 B.R. at 736.
52

5

Id.

* Fed.R.Bankr.P 3018(c).
56 246 B.R. at 331.

" Id, quoting from Brunswick Leasing Corp. v. Wisconsin Central Ltd., 136 F.2d
521, 526 (7th Cit. 1998), which quoted from Wargel v. First Nat'l Bank of
Harrisburg 121 Ill.App.3d. 730, 736 (1984).
" For another decision narrowly construing the phrase "authorized agent" with
respect to the right to vote on a chapter 11 plan, see In re Southland Corp., 124 B.R.
211 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991) (beneficial holders, rather than record holders, of debt
securities could vote on a chapter 11 plan; the record holders were not authorized
agents of the beneficial holders).
9 246 B.R. at 332.
60
61

Id.
Id. See also, Daniel C. Cohn, SubordinatedClaims: Their Classificationand Voting

Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 56 Amer. Bankr. L.J. 293, 316 (1982)
("Unrestricted voting of subordinated claims by senior creditors robs the subordinated claimants of the opportunity to decline to assent, without providing any other
protection for their interests. An unrestricted voting provision in a subordination
agreement should not be enforced, and agreements that do not provide for unrestricted voting should not be interpreted to require it."); James L. Lopes,
ContractualSubordinationsand Bankruptcy, 97 Banking L.J. 204, 217 (1980) ("A
negotiated plan of arrangement could never be reached if the subordinated creditors
did not have the power to block confirmation if they were not satisfied with the
arrangement.").
62 1994 WL 646176 (E.D.La. 1994) (discussed supra).
63 See also Matter ofHeller-Sperry,Inc., 154 F. Supp. 359 (D.R.I. 1957), where creditors, including a holder of a debenture, signed an agreement subordinating their
claims to certain bank loans, assigning their claims to the banks as security for the
bank loans, granting the banks the right to vote the subordinated claims in a reorganization case, and granting the banks' agent the right to file proofs of claim to
enforce such subordinated claims. When the debtor filed a bankruptcy petition, the
banks' agent had possession of the debenture. Although the banks' right to vote the
debenture claim was not at issue, the district court held that the banks' agent was
the only person entitled to file a proof of claim and that a proof of claim filed by the
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debenture holder had to be expunged. Based on the court's reasoning, the court
probably would have permitted the banks to vote the debenture claim in the bankruptcy case.
6
See note 41 supra for a discussion of Meinhard, Greff& Co. v. Brown, 199 E2d
70 (4th Cit. 1952), where the court held that a pledgee of a bond that had a face
amount greater than the debt for which it was pledged was entitled to vote the claim
represented by the bond in the issuer's reorganization case under the former
Bankruptcy Act, but only to the extent of the amount secured by the bond.
65 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001 (e)(3) and (4).
" Advisory Committee Note, E R. Bank. P. 3001. The Advisory Committee Note
cites Feder v. John Engelhorn & Sons, 202 E2d 411 (2d Cir. 1953) as authority for
this statement.
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